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Introduction
In international terms, privatisation policies have been in vogue
for over thirty years as governments around the world have
adopted such policies in an effort to improve the delivery of
public services. The term privatisation is sometimes used to
loosely describe various measures adopted for the purpose of
transferring functions previously fulfilled by the state to the
private sector. These include the divestiture of state owned
enterprises (SOEs) such as public utilities, the contracting out of
public services (for example, local authority services such as street
cleaning) and private sector participation in the provision of
physical infrastructure and related services (for example,
motorway concessions). 
This paper concentrates on the sale of SOEs. By the turn of the
century over one trillion dollars worth of SOEs had been sold
into private ownership in industrialised, developing and
emerging economies (Bortolotti and Siniscalco, 2004). In
Europe alone almost US$970 billion has been raised from the
sale of SOEs between 1977 and 2008, with the majority of that
revenue raised from the mid-1990s onwards.1 Ireland has been
part of this international trend and roughly half the stock of
commercial SOEs in Ireland has been sold over the last twenty
years raising over €8.3 billion for the Irish Exchequer.
The rationale for the privatisation of SOEs varies. In both
emerging and developed economies privatisation has been
central to measures aimed at reducing the overall level of state
activity in the economy. In most circumstances privatisation has
been promoted as a means of improving the productive
efficiency of SOEs by exposing managers and employees to
arguably stronger incentive structures under private ownership.
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Privatisation has also proved attractive to policy makers on the
grounds that it presents a useful means of raising revenues for the
Exchequer, particularly in times of fiscal pressures. 
There is now a vast literature covering the degree to which
privatisation policies have succeeded or failed in the pursuit of
these objectives. This paper however focuses on the Exchequer
related objectives of privatisation in the context of Ireland. In
particular it examines the extent to which Irish governments
have maximised the net proceeds from the divestiture of SOEs.
Since cost minimisation represents the corollary of revenue
maximisation, the paper focuses on the costs associated with
privatisation in Ireland and examines the details and magnitude
of these costs in an international comparative context.
The costs of privatisation: key issues and international
experience
When SOES are privatised the return to the Exchequer depends
on the price received for the company and the magnitude of the
direct and indirect costs incurred. Indirect costs result from the
underpricing of shares or the allocation of shares at preferential
rates to employees whereas direct costs consist of promotion,
advisory, investment banker, legal and accountancy fees. The
nature and extent of these costs has received significant attention
in the privatisation literature with critics of privatisation
frequently drawing attention to the excessive nature of these
costs (Martin, 1993) as well as the wider question of the
involvement of large accountancy firms and banking interests in
both policy formulation and policy implementation in the
sphere of public service reform (Shaoul et al, 2007). The
following sections provide a fuller description of the direct and
indirect costs incurred when privatising SOEs.
Underpricing and other indirect costs
The indirect costs of privatisation consist of the cost of
underpricing, the granting of free or bonus shares to certain
investors and other costs such as debt write-offs or indemnities.
32 DÓNAL PALCIC AND EOIN REEVES
02 Palcic article_Admin 58 Vol. 1  07/04/2010  11:43  Page 32
By far the largest indirect cost related to most privatisations is the
cost of underpricing. The vast majority of empirical studies on
the costs associated with privatisation concentrate on this
particular aspect rather than direct costs or other less significant
costs. Most authors agree that the extent of undervaluation varies
according to the method of sale and to the various underlying
political and economic objectives of privatising governments.
In relation to share issue privatisations, whenever a company is
new to the market and there are no comparable companies
already trading on the stock exchange, underpricing is inevitable
as all governments wish to avoid political loss of face and
minimise the chances that individual investors will incur capital
losses. Even when a company is not new to the market or there
are comparable companies listed on the stock exchange, Vickers
and Yarrow (1988: 171) claim some degree of underpricing is
preferable for governments, since overpricing would leave the
government with shares on their hands, applicants for shares
would face losses and there would be general embarrassment for
the government. 
The question of whether share issue privatisations are
characterised by excessive underpricing has received some
attention in the privatisation literature. Dewenter and Malatesta
(1997) provide one of the few in-depth studies into this issue.
They explicitly compare privatisation initial public offerings
(IPOs) with private company IPOs across 109 divestitures in
eight countries. They conclude that there is no general tendency
for governments to underprice IPOs to a greater extent than
private issues. The exception to this general finding was the UK
where, for larger privatisations, the existence of political
objectives was found to have led to discounts far in excess of
those in typical private issues in the UK. 
Another standout feature of the UK privatisation programme in
the 1980s was the decision to sell a number of SOEs in ‘one go’.
For example, large companies like British Gas and British
Airways were sold all in one go, while half of British
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Telecommunications (BT) was offered at the IPO stage in 1984.
Buckland (1987), Vickers and Yarrow (1988) and Jenkinson and
Mayer (1994) all argue that the methods of sale chosen by the
UK government were seriously flawed and that selling a
company’s equity in several tranches is far superior to selling all
the shares at once.2 Although there is still the problem of setting
the initial share price, ‘once the first tranche is sold, a well-
established market exists and further tranches can be priced with
some accuracy’ (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988: 184).
These claims are supported by the findings of Bel (1998), Huang
and Levich (1999) and Jones et al (1999) in relation to the level
of underpricing associated with privatisation IPOs and
privatisation subsequent public offerings (SPOs). The results
which are summarised in Table 1 clearly show that the average
discounts related to the price of IPOs are considerably higher
than the discounts related to the prices set for SPOs. For
example, Bel (1998) finds that the average cost of underpricing
for all Spanish share offerings was 3.4 per cent. Although the
average discount for IPOs was found to be 14.4 per cent, most
of the revenues from public offerings accrued from SPOs where
the average discount was found to be just over 2 per cent. 
This available evidence therefore indicates that selling shares in
stages is likely to reduce the extent of underpricing when
privatising SOEs.
Direct Costs
The direct costs associated with various privatisation
programmes include the costs of promotion, professional and
advisory fees, and underwriting fees. While the magnitude of
such costs has typically not been as large as the cost of
2 Indeed, Buckland (1987) estimates that the cost of underpricing associated with the
sale of 50 per cent of BT alone amounted to some GBP£1.2 billion. The author
claims that ‘had 10 per cent of BT been sold at the quotation stage, at a (pessimistic)
discount of 10 per cent, followed by further sales totalling 40 per cent at a
(pessimistic) discount of 5 per cent on the same market price, discounting costs
would have been GBP£924 millions lower’ (Buckland, 1987: 247).
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underpricing, these costs can still result in significant reductions
in revenues from privatisation. 
A selection of the empirical evidence on the direct costs related
to the sale of SOEs is summarised in Table 2. The findings in
relation to the direct costs incurred as part of the UK’s
privatisation programme prior to 1988 differ slightly across
studies. Both Buckland (1987) and Jenkinson and Mayer (1988)
included every privatised SOE in the UK whereas Vickers and
Yarrow (1988) only included the sale of major privatised
companies. Buckland (1987) argues that costs were higher in the
bigger issues as the government used them as a means of
widening share ownership making them more expensive to
market. The author claims that ‘the attempt to market
abnormally large proportions of large business’ equity to a
fragmented ownership is inevitably costly and adds to the picture
of large-scale, avoidable costs of the policy’ (1987: 250). 
The fact that Vickers and Yarrow (1988) report higher average
direct costs as a percentage of proceeds is thus understandable
since they concentrate solely on large share issue privatisations.
The authors note that in the case of the two most expensive asset
sales in their analysis – BT and British Gas – the two largest
components of expenses related to the sales were small
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Table 1: Average Underpricing in Privatisation Divestitures
(Initial and Subsequent Public Offerings)
Authors Year Country IPO SPO
Underpricing Underpricing 
Buckland† 1987 UK 15.9 – 
Vickers and Yarrow 1988 UK 18.4 – 
Jenkinson and Mayer† 1988 UK / France 32.8 / 18.6 – 
Dewenter and Malatesta 1997 8 countries 25.6 – 
Bel 1998 Spain 14.4 2.1 
Huang and Levich 1999 39 countries 32.1 7.17 
Jones et al 1999 59 countries 34.1 9.4 
Harris and Lye† 2001 Australia 13.66 
† Authors’ own elaboration of results presented in each study.
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Table 2: Empirical Evidence on Direct Costs
Authors Year Country Direct Costs as a 
percentage of proceeds 
Buckland 1987 UK 4.20 
Vickers and Yarrow † 1988 UK 5.18 
Jenkinson and Mayer † 1988 UK 3.77 
Bel 1998 Spain 4.00 
Jones et al * 1999 59 countries 3.90 
Harris and Lye † 2001 Australia 3.18 
* Jones et al (1999) only report cost of underwriting as a percentage of the
issue proceeds and do not include other expenses associated with the
flotation process.
† Authors’ own elaboration of results presented in each study.
shareholder incentives consisting of bill vouchers and bonus
shares (totalling GBP£111 million in the case of BT and
GBP£185 million in the case of British Gas) and the fees and
commissions associated with the underwriting and placing of
shares.3
Bel (1998) finds that the direct costs incurred in Spanish
privatisations amounted to 4 per cent of total proceeds, with
financial intermediary expenses such as underwriting fees
accounting for the majority of direct costs. More recently, Harris
and Lye (2001) in their study on the fiscal consequences of
privatisation in Australia find that the direct costs of Australian
privatisations amount to just over 3 per cent, suggesting that
Australian sales were reasonably cost efficient in comparison to
UK privatisation costs. However, it must be noted that some of
the costs presented in their analysis are expected costs sourced
from prospectuses and, as such, may be considerably
understated.4 Buckland (1987), Vickers and Yarrow (1988) and
3 Their analysis, however, excludes the costs borne by the companies themselves,
which were substantial in some cases. For example, BT is estimated to have spent over
GBP£8 million in advisory fees and approximately GBP£25 million on its flotation
advertising campaign (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988: 182).
4 Furthermore, the analysis of Harris and Lye (2001) does not include costs borne by
the companies themselves during the process of sale and thus may be further
understated.
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Jenkinson and Mayer (1994) all point out that prospectuses
released by companies being privatised tend to significantly
underestimate the true costs of the privatisations. 
In general, the largest portion of the direct costs incurred as part
of privatisation in various countries relates to underwriting fees.
Both Mayer and Meadowcroft (1985) and Vickers and Yarrow
(1988) argue that there is no overriding reason why governments
need to spend large amounts of money on underwriting fees.
Governments do not face the cash flow constraints of a private
firm. Private firms often depend critically on selling all of the
shares being offered when raising funds or else they face
becoming severely indebted. It thereby makes good sense for
private firms to underwrite their issues. Governments face no
such cash constraint as their borrowing powers can more than
make up for any shortfall in share proceeds with ease. Secondly,
governments are far more capable of bearing risk than private
firms and, more specifically, underwriters.5
The preceding section highlights the importance of the issue of
direct and indirect costs in terms of the objective of maximising
the revenue accruing to the government. The underpricing of
shares generally accounts for the majority of the costs incurred,
however this can be viewed as a necessary sacrifice if widening
share ownership is a key policy objective of a privatising
government. The following section turns to the case of Ireland
and examines the question of how the proceeds from
privatisation have been diminished by direct and indirect costs as
well as other factors such as employee share ownership
programmes that are pertinent to the Irish case.
Privatisation and Exchequer Finances in Ireland
Figure 1 displays the total proceeds from privatisation accrued by
each member of the EU-15 between 1977 and 2008. As
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5 Harris and Lye (2001) corroborate this argument by pointing out that the costs of
the sale of the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories (CSL) were substantially lower at
2.2 per cent than other Australian privatisations and this can be attributed to the fact
that the sale was not underwritten.
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expected, the four largest countries in the EU15, France,
Germany, Italy and the UK have accrued the most revenue with
public offerings of shares in their telecommunications and utility
companies accounting for a significant amount of the revenue
raised. Smaller countries such as Ireland, Denmark and Belgium
have generated the least amount of revenue, with Belgium,
Denmark and Sweden the only countries to have generated the
majority of revenue from private sales rather than public
offerings.
Since 1991 Ireland has privatised ten state-owned enterprises
generating gross proceeds to the Exchequer of over €8.3 billion.
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Figure 1: Privatisation Revenues by EU15 Country from 1977-
2008
Source: Author’s elaboration of Privatization Barometer data. Note: (1) Luxembourg
was not included given the small size of its economy and limited scope for
privatisation; (2) Privatization Barometer data includes proceeds from both direct and
indirect privatisations. In direct privatisations, where the government sells a partial or
full shareholding in an SOE, the sales proceeds accrue directly to the Exchequer. In
indirect privatisations, where for example an SOE or privatised SOE sells a subsidiary
company, the proceeds accrue to the divesting company and not necessarily to the
Exchequer. (3) The revenues above are expressed in current prices. When converted
to constant prices, the UK privatisation programme is placed first since the majority
of its divestitures took place during the 1980s and 1990s, whereas much of the
revenue raised by France, Italy and Germany have stemmed from more recent sales.
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Although the number of enterprises sold and the Exchequer
revenues raised are low by European and international standards,
this largely reflects the size of the economy. It should also be
noted that privatisation has had a significant effect in terms of
reducing the extent of state activity in the direct provision of
goods and services in strategically important sectors such as
telecommunications and air transport as well as food and steel
production.
A number of different methods have been adopted by the Irish
state when divesting of its shareholdings. In the first two sales,
those of Irish Life and Irish Sugar in 1991, the government
floated majority shareholdings on the stock exchange by IPO.
The remainder of its shareholdings were subsequently divested
between 1993 and 1995 in seasoned public offerings where
shares were placed with institutional investors. Shares were also
sold by IPO in the case of Eircom and Aer Lingus. The sale of
Eircom was the largest ever flotation on the Irish stock exchange
with the government selling its remaining shareholding of 50.1
per cent in July 1999. All other privatisations were executed by
trade sale with the three state owned banks (ACC, ICC and
TSB), the shipping company B&I Line, Irish Steel and the Irish
National Petroleum Company (INPC) all sold to going
concerns. 
Table 3 displays the actual proceeds that accrued to the
Exchequer from the ten Irish privatisations to date as well as the
direct costs associated with each sale. Direct costs consist of
expenses such as advisory, advertising, legal and underwriting
fees incurred by the government in order to prepare SOEs for
divestiture. Table 3 shows that the direct costs incurred for Irish
divestitures amounted to an aggregate of 1.43 per cent of gross
proceeds. When compared with international experience
outlined earlier in Table 2, the direct costs incurred in Ireland are
comparatively low. However, it must be noted that the direct
costs displayed in Table 3 exclude the costs incurred by the
companies themselves. For instance, Aer Lingus itself is
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estimated to have paid some €30 million in commissions, fees
and expenses prior to flotation on the stock market in 2006.6
Table 3: Exchequer Proceeds and Direct Costs in Ireland
Company Year of Proceeds Expenses (2) as %
Sale (€’000s) (€’000s) of (1) 
(1) (2)  
Greencore 1991 210,650.8 1,726.84 0.82 
Irish Life 1991 601,930.8 9,404.95 1.56 
B&I 1992 10,792.8 – –
Irish Steel 1996 0 655.68 – 
Eircom 1999 6,399,907.9 97,642.86 1.53 
ICC 2001 322,274.8 913.49 0.28 
TSB 2001 408,350.3 460.66 0.11 
INPC 2001 20,000.0 1,480.14 7.40 
ACC 2002 154,603.0 1,159.48 0.75 
Aer Lingus 2006 240,902.3 6,000.0 2.49 
Total 8,369,412.7 119,444.11 1.43 
Source: Author’s own calculations from Exchequer Statements, Dáil Éireann reports
and information requested from the Department of Finance. Notes: (1) TSB and
ACC expenses include advisor fees for proposed TSB/ACC merger incurred between
1999 and 2000. Fifty per cent of the total fees of €621,346 was allocated to each
company; (2) the table above details direct proceeds accruing to the Exchequer only.
Indirect proceeds that accrued to the privatised company are excluded. For example,
when Aer Lingus was floated on the stock exchange in 2006, the government allowed
the airline to issue new shares which raised over €530 million for the company.
As noted earlier, the direct costs associated with share issue
privatisations are generally higher than those incurred when
other methods of sale are adopted. This difference can be
attributed to the significant cost of underwriting large share
issues. For example, in their empirical analysis of share issue
privatisations internationally, Jones et al (1999) found that the
average cost of underwriting as a percentage of the issue amount
averaged 3.9 per cent. In the Irish case, the most expensive sale
was that of Eircom in 1999, with over €74 million of the €97.6
million in direct costs incurred paid to Merrill Lynch/AIB who
6 Aer Lingus Prospectus, 2006.
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coordinated and underwrote the IPO. As a percentage of the
revenue raised from the IPO this amounted to approximately
1.77 per cent.7
An important question that arises is whether large underwriting
fees incurred as part of the Eircom flotation, as well as the other
three SOEs floated on the stock market, could have been
avoided. As noted previously, in comparison to private sector
firms, the government’s superior capacity to bear risk and the fact
that it faces a considerably lower cash flow constraint raises the
question as to why it does not underwrite any issue itself? The
issue of hiring a private sector underwriter becomes even more
questionable when one considers the significant underpricing of
shares that occurred during the IPOs of the four Irish SOEs
floated to date. 
Underpricing
An important set of indirect costs in the case of share issue
privatisations concerns underpricing. Undervaluation of shares is
calculated here as the difference between the IPO price and the
share price after one days trading. This avoids the problems that
can arise if later prices are used since they can be affected by news
that could not have been taken into account at the time when the
shares were originally priced. For example, three days after the
flotation of Aer Lingus in 2006, Ryanair launched a surprise
hostile takeover bid that valued shares approximately 27 per cent
higher than the initial IPO price. 
Table 4 demonstrates that the total cost of underpricing in the
case of the four Irish public enterprises privatised by IPO
amounts to almost €843 million. This figure equates to just over
16 per cent of the proceeds raised from share issue privatisations
and almost 10.1 per cent of the total proceeds from the entire
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7 This figure is based on the €4.2 billion raised by the government as part of the IPO.
The total proceeds for the sale of Eircom, which are detailed in Table 1, also include
payments received from the Comsource consortium and the ESOP for their
respective stakes.
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Irish privatisation programme, a substantial loss of revenue to the
Exchequer. The level of discounting ranged from 4.38 per cent
in the case of the IPO of Irish Life to 18.46 per cent in the case
of Eircom. Although significant, especially in the case of Eircom,
the discounts related to Irish IPOs have been relatively low when
compared with the international empirical evidence outlined
previously in Table 1. 
The high cost of discounting in the case of Eircom (18.46 per
cent) compared to Irish Life (3.6 per cent) and Greencore (8.29
per cent) is attributable to the method of sale chosen in each
case. Contrary to indications given just months before flotation
the government opted to float its entire 50.1 per cent stake in
Eircom in one go. In contrast both Irish Life and Irish Sugar were
sold in stages with an IPO establishing a market price which
allowed subsequent placements of shares to be priced more
accurately, thus reducing the size of discounts. The Irish
experience is thus in line with the empirical evidence reviewed
earlier where a number of authors argued that this approach to
privatisation maximises exchequer proceeds.
In the most recent share issue privatisation, the government
opted to retain approximately 28 per cent of its 85.1 per cent
shareholding in Aer Lingus at the time of flotation. A valuation
range for the airline was set between €2.10 and €2.70 with the
government eventually opting to set the IPO price at the lower
level of the range at €2.20. This was surprising given that the
main objective of the flotation was to raise capital for the airline’s
future investment requirements. Although the underpricing
from the first day’s trading amounted to just under 11 per cent,
Ryanair’s hostile bid for the airline three days after the flotation
valued Aer Lingus at €2.80 per share, indicating that the airline
had been significantly undervalued. 
Debt Write-offs
Direct costs incurred as part of the sales of public enterprises can
also consist of debt write-offs and other financial undertakings
on the part of the Exchequer in order to prepare a company for
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divestiture. The sales of B&I, Irish Steel and the INPC all
involved significant debt write-offs and the payment of other
liabilities outstanding prior to being sold. 
In the case of B&I Line, all of the company’s substantial long
term debt of over €44 million was written off prior to divestiture
with the government claiming it was necessary in order for any
bid for the company to be made. The rationale behind such a
large write-off in conjunction with the low purchase price
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Table 4: Share Discounts in SOEs Privatised by Flotation in Ireland
Company Offer Day 1 Share Proceeds Cost of Total cost
Price Price Discount (€m) Discount as % gross
(€) (€) (%) (€m)   proceeds 
Greencore I 2.92 3.25 11.30 80.019 9.042 – 
Greencore II 3.36 3.52 4.70 41.913 1.970 – 
Greencore III 3.49 3.75 7.27 88.719 6.450 –   
210.651 17.462 8.29 
Irish Life I 2.03 2.12 4.38 343.337 15.038 – 
Irish Life II 2.41 2.54 5.39 132.688 6.634 – 
Irish Life III 2.73 2.73 0.00 125.906 0.00 –   
601.931 21.672 3.60 
Eircom 3.90 4.62 18.46 4,212.215 777.575 –     
Aer Lingus 2.20 2.44 10.91 240.902 26.282 – 
Total 5,265.699 842.991 16.01 
Source: Exchequer Statements, Irish Stock Exchange, Davy’s Stockbrokers,
Goodbody’s Stockbrokers. Notes: (1) The Day 1 price quoted above for the second
and third placements of shares in both Irish Life and Greencore relate to the closing
price on the day prior to the placement of shares. (2) The total cost of discount in the
case of Greencore and Irish Life excludes the cost of free shares granted to employees
as well as the offer of further shares at a discount.8
8 Irish Sugar employees each received some €317 worth of free shares and the option
of subscribing for 500 additional shares at a 20 per cent discount (‘Irish Sugar
employees to receive £250 in free shares’, Irish Times, Thursday March 21, 1991).
Beet growers were also offered shares at a 20 per cent discount as part of the
Greencore IPO. Irish Life employees each received approximately €650 in free shares
and priority access to a further small portion of shares where they received tax relief
on the purchase (‘Small investors take bulk of Irish Life public offering’, Irish Times,
Friday July 19, 1991).
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ultimately accepted (€10.8 million) was questionable for a
number of reasons: 
(1) the company had recently begun to turn itself around
after implementing significant rationalisation measures
and was projecting an operating profit of over €5 million
before repayments on debt in the year of privatisation; 
(2) an accumulated €127 million in corporation tax losses
would be transferred to the new owners which would
enable them to avoid paying any corporation tax for a
number of years;9
(3) the new owners would have access to the surplus on
B&I’s pension fund which was over-funded by
approximately €14 million;10 and 
(4) the Government had recently injected some €7.6 million
into the B&I in preparation for privatisation which, in
effect, represented an indirect debt write-off. 
It was well known that the government had been conducting
private negotiations with B&I’s new owner, ICG, since 1990 and
was very much in favour of an ICG takeover of B&I, especially
given that ICG was an Irish operation. The €7.6 million cash
injection into the company prior to divestiture was seen as a
further incentive to facilitate an ICG bid for the company.11
While the government’s decision to sell B&I Line is
understandable given the substantial capital injections it had
made in the company since 1965, the timing of the company’s
sale makes little sense. Had the government written off B&I’s
debt and then let the company trade profitably without being
hindered by debt repayments for a number of years, it could have
established a solid trading record and would arguably have
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9 Dáil Éireann, ‘B & I Line Bill, 1991: Second Stage’, 10 December, 1991.
10 Gallagher, J. (1991) ‘ICG May Take Over B&I Before End of Year’, Irish Times,
August 23 1991.
11 Dunne, J. (1990) ‘Secret Shipping Merger Plan Shelved’, Irish Times, March 14
1990.
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attracted a significantly higher bid if sold.12 Although it is
difficult to estimate the true value of B&I, it is worth noting that
ICG was trading at 8.8 times its pre-interest earnings at the end
of 1990.13 Given that B&I had made an operating profit of
€3.17 million in 1991 and was projecting profits of over €5
million in 1992 with further increases likely due to the
implementation of more rationalisation measures, the company
was arguably worth three to four times the €10.8 million
received using even a conservative earnings multiplier.14
The sale of Irish Steel necessitated the write-off of €21.5 million
in debt as well as the payment of approximately €25.7 million to
the new owner, ISPAT, to cover various items such as interest
charges on debt, environmental works, provision for expenses,
indemnities and compensation for future restrictions on
production.15 The rationale for the considerable debt write-off in
this case is reasonable given the large losses accrued by the
company and its poor performance record despite significant
capital investment by the state in the years prior to privatisation.
Although the government only received a nominal sale price of
IRP£1,16 ISPAT took on the remaining debt of almost €25
million as part of the deal, as well as agreeing to invest €38
million over a five year period after privatisation.17 The sale of
Irish Steel to ISPAT was arguably the best deal the government
could have expected to achieve, saving the company from
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12 It is noteworthy that Irish Sugar had been a loss-maker up until 1986 but after
returning to profitability in the four years prior to flotation and eliminating its
accumulated losses, its sale generated significant revenues for the Exchequer.
13 Murdoch, B. (1990) ‘State pulls the plug on B&I loss making’, Irish Times,
September 24 1990.
14 McGrath, B. (1991) ‘B&I Line is going for a poor song’, Irish Times, December 16
1991.
15 Over €9 million was paid to ISPAT by way of compensation for the future
restrictions on production and sales imposed by the European Commission in return
for state aid to be granted.
16 The fixed euro conversion rate for the Irish punt is IRP£1 = €1.2697381.
17 McGrath, B. (1995) ‘Final agreement on Irish Steel sale concluded’, Irish Times,
September 2 1995.
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probable liquidation and securing the future of the company for
another five years.
The privatisation of the INPC18 involved a large debt write-off
as well as an €83 million indemnity to cover any future
environmental liabilities the new owners might incur due to
pollution from the refinery and terminal operations. Prior to the
sale of the INPC, the company had invested some €60 million
in upgrading the Whitegate refinery in 1999 in order to meet EU
Auto Oil 1 emission standards introduced in 2000. The debt
associated with this investment was written off as part of the sale
with the overall costs and write-offs of the assets and liabilities
related to the sale amounting to €76 million. A total
consideration of €47 million was received from the sale resulting
in a net loss of €28.75 million (INPC Annual Report, 2001).19
The sale resulted in the cessation of most of the INPC’s activities,
however the INPC was still left with its outstanding debts after
the sale with net debt standing at €54.464 million at the end of
2001. 
The large write-off and indemnity granted as part of the sale of
the INPC represented a very poor deal for the Exchequer,
particularly given the fact that the company had only recently
invested a considerable sum of money in upgrading its refining
operations. The failure of the government to secure a better deal
was highlighted at the beginning of 2007 when Conoco Phillips
announced that it was putting the Whitegate refinery up for sale
for approximately €350 million.20 Although Conoco Phillips
18 The privatisation of the INPC had unique characteristics. Only the Whitegate
refinery and Bantry terminal subsidiaries were divested in 2001. The INPC continues
as an SOE with the principal activities of the company now reduced to the
management of the national strategic stock of petroleum products. The costs and
write-offs associated with the sale of the refinery and terminal operations and the
creation of an employee share scheme were charged to the profit and loss account of
the company and as such did not directly accrue to the Exchequer.
19 €98 million was also received in repayment of the intercompany balances of the
two subsidiaries sold (INPC Annual Report, 2001).
20 Hancock, C. (2001) ‘Whitegate oil refinery needs $400m investment’, Irish Times,
June 23 2007.
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had invested in further upgrading of the facility since 2001, and
in the end decided not to sell the refinery, the high value placed
on the Whitegate facility calls into question why the government
agreed a sale price of just €116 million for the refinery, while
writing off much of the company’s debts as well as guaranteeing
future environmental liabilities.21
In the case of the ACC bank, the government also granted an
indemnity of €12.7 million to new owners, Rabobank, to cover
them from any potential liability that could have arisen from an
ongoing legal case against the ACC.22 This represented a
significant transfer of risk particularly given the low sale price
ultimately agreed upon. Rabobank acquired the ACC for €165
million, equivalent to the ACC’s book value at the end of 2000
but just 0.9 times the expected book value for the 2001 year-end.
Although the bank made a loss in 2000 after being fined €21
million in relation to tax arrears, the ACC had improved its
profitability significantly in the years leading up to its sale and
one must question the rationale of the government in selling the
bank at a 10 per cent discount when banks are generally sold at
a premium. Indeed, the TSB had been sold to Irish Life and
Permanent earlier in the year at 1.8 times its book value.23
Moreover, when one considers that part of the proceeds to the
Exchequer arising from the sale of the ACC were transferred to
employees as part of the ESOP agreement, the deal represents a
very poor return for the taxpayer. 
The rationale behind privatising companies such as the B&I,
Irish Steel and the INPC is understandable. However, the
21 The €116 million sale price accepted in 2001 also included the oil storage terminal
operation at Whiddy Island in Bantry as well as an office block in Dublin.
22 The legal case against the ACC arose out of its involvement as the lead bank of a
consortium of lenders in a Dublin city hotel development. The development ran over
budget causing the banks to lose money and the ACC was subsequently sued by a
number of banks involved in the consortium.
23 McGrath, B. (2001) ‘Dutch Rabobank pays €165m for ACCBank’, Irish Times,
December 6 2001.
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government’s failure to secure a better return for the Exchequer
when selling the INPC and B&I resulted in significant losses for
the Exchequer. Had the government allowed the B&I some time
to operate without its crippling debt burden, the taxpayer would
undoubtedly have recouped some of the investment that went
into the company in the preceding twenty-five years. Similarly,
in the case of the INPC, the failure of the government to
negotiate a better deal, particularly given the substantial capital
injections into the Whitegate refinery prior to divestiture, is
open to legitimate criticism. 
ESOPs
A distinguishing feature of the Irish privatisation programme
since 1999 has been the transfer of significant shareholdings to
employees as part of the privatisation process. These schemes are
commonly referred to as Employee Share Ownership Plans
(ESOPs) and are generally granted in return for a restructuring
and rationalisation deal. As the conditions attached to ESOPs
can involve allocating shares at less than their market value, this
can reduce the revenues accruing to the Exchequer considerably. 
The first privatisation involving the establishment of an ESOP
was that of Eircom in 1999. Prior to the sale of Eircom, unions
had been the biggest obstacle to privatisation and the negotiation
of an ESOP was used to ‘neutralise union opposition to
privatisation by means of the substitution of employee
participation in companies at board level with financial
participation through Employee Share Ownership Plans’
(Sweeney, 2004: 16). 
In the case of the Eircom ESOP, employees negotiated a 14.9
stake in the company in exchange for a partnership agreement.
Five per cent of the shares were granted in return for employees’
acceptance of a rationalisation plan24 with the remaining 9.9 per
24 The plan consisted of 2,500 redundancies as well as other cost cutting measures
over a period of five years.
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cent of shares purchased by the ESOP at a preferential rate of
€241 million which was determined by an independent
valuation of the firm. As part of the partnership agreement,
Eircom agreed to contribute €127 million25 towards the cost of
acquiring these shares with the remaining €114 million funded
by the ESOP through a loan. 
Table 5: Cost of ESOPs in Irish privatisations
Company 14.9% Sold For 14.9% Value Cost of ESOP
(€’000s) (€’000s) (€’000s) 
Eircom 241,250 1,252,735 1,011,484 
ICC 25,141 52,028 26,887 
TSB 25,141 64,136 38,995 
ACC 12,189 24,585 12,385 
INPC n/a n/a n/a 
Aer Lingus n/a 173,730 n/a 
Total 1,089,751
Source: Author’s own calculations from government publications. Notes: (1) in the
case of the INPC, the company contributed €8.87 million to fund an Employee
Share Scheme for employees transferred to the purchaser; (2) the Aer Lingus ESOP
had been in existence for a number of years prior to privatisation and it was not
possible to estimate the cost to the Exchequer.
Based on the proceeds from the sale of the government’s 50.1
percent shareholding (which raised €4.2 billion), the 14.9
percent stake transferred to the ESOP was worth some €1.25
billion. The difference between the price paid by the ESOP for
its shareholding and its actual value amounts to over €1.01
billion. The establishment of this ESOP set a precedent. Since
the sale of Eircom, ESOPs of 14.9 per cent have been agreed in
all bar one of the five subsequent divestitures. The costs of
ESOPs are presented in Table 5. They are estimated to have cost
the Exchequer almost €1.1 billion, which represents over 13 per
cent of total privatisation proceeds.
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25 Eircom agreed to contribute €127 million in return for employees agreeing to
contribute 5.3 per cent of their salaries towards their pension schemes which prior to
then had been funded entirely by Eircom.
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Conclusion
The privatisation of SOEs offers an attractive opportunity for
governments to raise significant revenues for the Exchequer. This
paper quantifies both the direct and indirect costs incurred in the
execution of the ten divestitures in Ireland to date. Table 6
illustrates that these costs have amounted to over €2.14 billion,
or 25.6 per cent of total exchequer proceeds. We find that, with
the exception of Eircom, the level of underpricing and direct
costs incurred have been modest compared to those in other
industrialised countries. However, in the case of Eircom, which
accounts for approximately 88 per cent of aggregate privatisation
costs to date, these costs have been considerable.
We argue that the relatively high cost of underpricing in the case
of Eircom can be largely attributed to the government’s decision
to sell its entire stake in Eircom in one go. In this regard the case
of Eircom is an outlier in European comparative terms. In all
other EU15 countries, national telecommunications companies
have been sold by floating partial stakes on the stock market
followed by the sales of further tranches.26 As the majority of
these sales preceded the flotation of Eircom the Irish
government’s decision to eschew the option of a staggered
divestiture is particularly questionable.27
A unique feature of the Eircom privatisation was the transfer of
a 14.9 per cent shareholding to employees at a considerable
discount. The cost of this discount amounted to over €1 billion
in foregone revenue. It is striking that there was no international
precedent for either establishing a structured ESOP as part of the
privatisation process or for the transfer of a shareholding of such
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26 Italy is the only exception, with the Italian government opting to float its entire
stake in the firm at the IPO stage. In every other country a partial stake was either
floated on the stock market or placed with institutional investors, followed by
subsequent sales of partial stakes. Moreover, many European governments still retain
sizeable shareholdings in their national telecommunications operators.
27 With the exception of Sweden, Belgium and Austria, all other national
telecommunications operator flotations preceded the Eircom IPO.
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magnitude to employees. The establishment of the Eircom
ESOP set a standard for all subsequent privatisations and ESOPs
of 14.9 per cent are now the norm when Irish SOEs are
privatised. Table 6 shows that the cost of ESOPs has constituted
the most significant proportion of privatisation costs in sales
subsequent to the Eircom IPO. 
Once the decision is made to privatise a company, a number of
important subsequent decisions arise in relation to the
privatisation process. These include decisions in relation to the
timing of the sale, the amount of shares to be sold, the pricing of
shares and distributional issues such as preferential share
allocations. This paper highlights a number of sub-optimal
decisions concerning these issues in individual cases of
privatisation in Ireland. Whereas the precedent-setting Eircom
ESOP as well as the decision to sell the government’s entire stake
at the IPO stage dominate the aggregate costs incurred, the
analysis also draws attention to debatable decisions in relation to
debt write-offs (e.g. B&I Lines and INPC), indemnities granted
(INPC and ACC) and the valuation of companies (B&I Lines,
ACC and INPC). 
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Table 6: Gross Proceeds and Total Costs (€millions)
Company Gross Direct Indirect ESOPs Total
Proceeds Costs Costs (3) 1+2+3 
(1) (2) 
Greencore 210.651 1.727 17.462 – 19.189 
Irish Life 601.931 9.405 21.673 – 31.078 
B&I 10.793 – 44.441 – 44.441 
Irish Steel 0 0.656 47.328 – 47.984 
Eircom 6,399.908 97.643 777.575 1,011.484 1,886.702 
ICC 322.275 0.913 – 26.887 27.800 
TSB 408.350 0.461 – 38.995 39.456 
INPC 20.000 1.480 – – 1.480 
ACC 154.603 1.159 – 12.385 13.544 
Aer Lingus 240.902 6.000 26.282 – 32.282 
Total 8,369.413 119.444 934.761 1,089.751 2,143.956
Note: Indirect costs include the cost of underpricing and debt write-offs.
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Looking forward, it is important to note that the Irish state
continues to hold majority shareholdings in enterprises operating
in important sectors such as energy, transport and communica -
tions. The recent deterioration in the Irish public finances has
prompted a number of calls for the privatisation of some of these
enterprises. Although privatisation can raise useful revenues for
the Exchequer in the short to medium term it cannot however be
justified on this basis alone. The analysis provided in this paper
shows that the revenues from such sales are rarely maximised as
policymakers face a number of trade-offs when implementing
privatisation policies. Balancing these trade-offs poses significant
challenges and the analysis presented in this paper shows that
Irish policymakers have much to learn from the privatisation
programme to date.
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